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NOTES
CONTRACT LAW—ESTOPPING BIG BROTHER: THE CONSTITU
TION, TOO, HAS SQUARE CORNERS1
INTRODUCTION
Equitable estoppel, also known as “estoppel in pais,”2 is a com
mon law doctrine3 that “prevent[s] one party from taking unfair ad
vantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the
person to be estopped has induced another person to act in a cer
tain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in
some way.”4
In order for a party to be equitably estopped, they
must . . . :(1) . . . [make an affirmative] misrepresentation of fact
to another person having reason to believe that the other [would]
rely upon it; (2) the party seeking estoppel [must] rel[y] on [the
misrepresentations] to its detriment; and (3) the reliance [must
have been] reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did
1. The title is taken from a well-known quote from the great Justice Holmes in
Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v. United States where he emphasized that “[m]en must turn
square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island A. & L.R. Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (9th ed. 2009).
3. Equitable estoppel is sometimes confused with promissory estoppel. “Promis
sory estoppel” creates a cause of action that enforces an illusory promise as a contract
when no consideration exists, while equitable estoppel acts as a repellant to prevent a
party from raising a defense it would have in the absence of this doctrine. Id. at 631.
“Promissory estoppel is a sword, and equitable estoppel is a shield.” Jablon v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1054, 1068 (2d Cir. 1983). For further illustration, see Christopher S.
Pugsley, The Game of “Who Can You Trust?”–Equitable Estoppel Against the Federal
Government, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 101, 105 (2001); see also Mazer v. Jackson Ins.
Agency, 340 So. 2d 770, 772-73 (Ala. 1976).
Typically, equitable estoppel concerns a misrepresentation of past or present fact,
while promissory estoppel concerns one of a future act. The distinction between the
two types of estoppel is important because courts generally do not enforce claims of
promissory estoppel against the government due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Jablon, 657 F.2d at 1070.
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 630.
163
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not know nor should it have known that its adversary’s conduct
was misleading.5

While this doctrine has been invoked for hundreds of years
among private litigants,6 courts still struggle mightily over if and
when equitable estoppel should be applied against government
action.
Historically, equitable estoppel7 was not allowed against the
government under any circumstance.8 The reasons for this are not
without merit. These reasons include: protecting the public fisc
(and fears of the resulting crushing liability from the numerous law
suits emanating from the immense level of communication between
the government and its citizenry),9 preventing the infringement of
the federal government’s sovereign immunity,10 avoiding schemes
5. Mimiya Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 331 F.3d 178, 182 (1st
Cir. 2003). While these are the traditional elements of equitable estoppel, many courts
have added that with regard to governmental acts, there must be an “affirmative mis
conduct” on behalf of the governmental agent that is greater than mere negligence. See
infra Part II.C.
6. See Michael Cameron Pitou, Equitable Estoppel: Its Genesis, Development
and Application in Government Contracting, 19 PUB. CONT. L.J. 606, 607 (1990) (stat
ing that “[equitable estoppel’s] origins can be traced back to at least the Twelfth Cen
tury in medieval England”). See also MELVIN M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF ESTOPPEL 1 (1872).
7. Hereinafter “equitable estoppel” will be simply referred to as “estoppel” un
less otherwise noted.
8. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917)
(“[I]t is enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its
officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be
done what the law does not sanction or permit.”); Trs. of Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Exe
ter, 27 A.2d 569, 586 (N.H. 1940) (“[T]he principle of sovereignty . . . would seem to
defeat a claim of estoppel . . . .”). But see United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. 720, 735
36 (1820); United States v. La Chappelle, 81 F. 152, 155 (C.C. Wash. 1897) (“The au
thorities cited by counsel for the defendants prove that the doctrine of estoppel may be
applied in some cases against the government.”).
9. Fred Ansell, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule
of Equitable Estoppel Against the Government, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026, 1027 (1986).
10. This doctrine has been withering for decades. See, e.g., Portmann v. United
States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1169 (7th Cir. 1982) ( “Sovereign immunity from contract and tort
liability naturally carried with it sovereign immunity from equitable estoppel.”). The
court also stated: “[a]s the doctrine of sovereign immunity eroded, it became necessary
to offer other justifications for the government’s exemption from equitable estoppel.”
Id. at 1159. See also United States v. Georgia-Pac. Co., 421 F.2d 92, 98-99 (9th Cir.
1970) (“Sovereign immunity has been on the decline at both the state and federal level.
It has been held generally that the Government is not subject to the same rules of
property and estoppel as are private suitors. Such governmental immunity from estop
pel is an off-shoot of sovereign immunity. Both the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
that of governmental immunity from estoppel have been much discussed, criticized and
limited in recent years.” (internal citations omitted)); State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands
Comm’n v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“Modern times have
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to defraud the government,11 and recognizing separation of powers
principles.12 In recent times, however, courts have realized that a
failure to estop the government in every instance can lead to grave
injustices.13
This Note will explore the legal history of equitable estoppel as
it is applied to the government, including Supreme Court case law
and subsequent interpretations by lower courts. It will then ex
amine the various issues created by the current unsettled state of
the equitable estoppel doctrine in the governmental context, and
how various commentators have proposed remedying these issues.14
Next, it will recognize that there is no panacea; each of these reme
dies are inadequate.15 Finally, this Note will put forth a new idea,
which is gaining traction in some circles, that when deciding equita
ble estoppel cases the government should apply each of these ap
proaches in conjunction with each other, but with one additional
element: when the government’s actions in effect allow it to sub
stantially undermine the core legislative purpose of the Act in ques
tion, the government should be estopped.16
I.

MODERN EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL JURISPRUDENCE

Realizing the potential for miscarriage of justice, the Supreme
Court has consistently eschewed a bright line rule against estopping
the government while refusing to adopt a test dictating when estop
pel of this type is permitted.17 If little else is clear, “equitable es
toppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private
seen the erosion of sovereign immunity in its various forms, including immunity from
the equitable defenses of the statute of limitations, laches and estoppel.”); Bernard
Schwartz, Estoppel and Crown Privilege in English Administrative Law, 55 MICH. L.
REV. 27, 27 (1957).
11. See Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 368-69 (1813).
12. David K. Thompson, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 551, 565 (1979).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part. IV.A-B.
17. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990) (“We
leave for another day whether an estoppel claim could ever succeed against the Gov
ernment.”); Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984) (“[W]e are hesi
tant, when it is unnecessary to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which
the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from es
toppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum
standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government.”
(emphasis added)).
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litigants.”18 Because of a lack of guidance, Supreme Court prece
dent provides ample opportunity for lower court interpretation in
order to achieve their version of justice.19
While in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has ad
dressed cases implicating the issue of whether equitable estoppel
should be applied against the government numerous times, the
Court has squarely addressed the issue just four times.
A. Cases Which Have Not Held the Government Estopped
1. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill
The first case in the modern era in which the Supreme Court
addressed equitable estoppel’s applicability to the government
found that ordinary recourse available for private litigants would
not be available against the federal government. Federal Crop In
surance Corp. v. Merrill 20 involved a group of farmers who applied
for insurance under the Federal Crop Insurance Act, seeking to in
sure their fields against a poor harvest.21 The statute’s purpose was
to protect wheat producers from financial catastrophe resulting
from Acts of God.22 The farmers applied for insurance through the
Bonneville County Agricultural Conservation Committee, a local
agent for the federal government, telling the Committee that they
were going to replant on land that had previously been a wheat
field.23 The Committee informed the farmers that their crop was
insurable, and they conveyed this to the federal government.24 The
government approved.25
18. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 419 (citing Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366
(1813)).
19. See supra Part I.A.
20. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). This case was dubbed
“the leading case in our modern line of estoppel decisions” by Justice Kennedy in Rich
mond, 496 U.S. at 420.
21. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 382.
22. This legislative purpose was clear to the court.
To carry out the purposes of the Act, the Corporation, Commencing with the
wheat . . . crops planted for harvest in 1945 is empowered to insure, upon such
terms and conditions not inconsistent with the provisions of this title as it may
determine, producers of wheat . . . against loss in yields due to unavoidable
causes, including drought.
Id. at 380 (alterations in original) (quotation marks in original to statutory material
omitted).
23. Id. at 382.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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Drought then struck the western states, and the farmers’ crop
failed.26 When the farmers sought to collect, the government dis
covered the crop had been reseeded, which prevented an insurance
policy from being written.27 The farmers sued.28
Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Idaho ruled for
the farmers, reasoning that since a private insurance company
would be bound by its error, the federal government should be as
well.29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari30 and reversed.31
The Court first stated that the farmers would likely have a via
ble cause of action against a private insurance company.32 How
ever, the Court denied that the government was “just another
private litigant” when it was engaged in business usually reserved
for the free market.33 With little more, the Court stated that be
cause of this, the government should not be estopped.34 The Court
held that the farmers had constructive notice that their insurance
policy was invalid because a regulation published in the Federal
Register was explicit in that regard.35
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 382-83.
30. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 331 U.S. 798 (1947).
31. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 380.
32. Id. at 383.
33. Id. In fact, the Court pointed out that this government program existed be
cause farmers like Merrill would not be able to obtain similar insurance on the private
market. Id. at 384 n.1.
34. Id. at 383. More specifically, the Court stated: “It is too late in the day to urge
that the Government is just another private litigant, for purposes of charging it with
liability, whenever it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enterprise
or engages in competition with private ventures.” Id. As will be explained, courts have
subsequently reconsidered this line of thinking and have reversed course. See infra Part
II.A.
35. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 383-86. Here Justice Frankfurter echoed Justice Holmes
when he said “[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.”
Id. at 385. To this, Justice Jackson tersely replied, “It is very well to say that those who
deal with the Government should turn square corners. But there is no reason why the
square corners should constitute a one-way street.” Id. at 387-88. Indeed Holmes’s
quote has met stiff resistance in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., United
States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 221 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice
Holmes once said that ‘(m)en must turn square corners when they deal with the Gov
ernment.’ I had always supposed this was a two-way street.” (alteration in original)); St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“It is
no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square cor
ners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in deal
ing with their Government.”); Comm’r v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 306 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“The revenue laws have become so complicated and intricate that I think
the Government in moving against the citizen should also turn square corners.”).
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Justice Jackson dissented, implicitly on equity grounds, stating:
I would affirm the decision of the court below . . . . I can see
no reason why we should not adopt a rule which recognizes the
practicalities of the business . . . . [I]t is an absurdity to hold that
every farmer who insures his crops knows what the Federal Reg
ister contains or even knows that there is such a publication. If
he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is
issued from time to time in order to make sure whether anything
has been promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need
crop insurance, for he would never get time to plant any crops.
Nor am I convinced that a reading of technically-worded regula
tions would enlighten him much in any event . . . one should not
be expected to have to employ a lawyer to see whether his own
Government is issuing him a policy which in case of loss would
turn out to be no policy at all.36

Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s sentiments, protection of the
government’s interest and regulatory authority were paramount in
the majority’s decision.37 This precedent would only become, if an
ything, strengthened by later Supreme Court rulings.
2. Schweiker v. Hansen
In Schweiker v. Hansen, the Supreme Court stated the general
rule that in order for the government to have been estopped, the
agent must have engaged in “affirmative misconduct,” but stopped
short of articulating what particular activity would constitute such
conduct.38 In Schweiker, a Social Security Administration (SSA)
field representative offered flawed advice to a recently widowed
mother.39 Hansen asked a representative at her local SSA field of
fice if she was eligible for “mother’s insurance benefits.”40 The rep
resentative told her that she was not eligible, and she did not file a
written application pursuant to this advice, despite the fact that an
SSA manual instructed representatives to tell applicants to fill out
36. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 386-88 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson then ad
vocated for a sweeping rule authorizing the use of estoppel against the government
stating that the Court should “lay[ ] down a federal rule that would hold these agencies
to the same fundamental principles of fair dealing that have been found essential in
progressive states to prevent insurance from being an investment in disappointment.”
Id. at 388.
37. Id. at 383-86.
38. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 787-88 (1982) (per curiam). See infra
note 132 and accompanying text.
39. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 786.
40. Id.
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applications even if they believed the applicant ineligible.41 Hansen
discovered a year later that she was in fact eligible.42 She then com
pleted the necessary paperwork and began receiving benefits, which
provided for a year’s benefits awarded retroactively.43 Had she fil
led out an application when she originally sought advice, she would
have been eligible for a year’s worth of benefits awarded retroac
tively at that time.44 After a series of administrative rulings against
Hansen, she sued for the year’s benefits she did not receive due to
the representative’s faulty advice.45
The trial court ruled for Hansen, and the Second Circuit af
firmed,46 holding that “misinformation provided by a Government
official combined with a showing of misconduct (even if it does not
rise to the level of a violation of a legally binding rule) should be
sufficient to require estoppel.”47 Additionally, the court pointed
out that “[a]ppellee was at all times ‘substantively’ eligible in the
sense that she was in the class of people that Congress intended to
benefit. It would fulfill the fundamental legislative goal to grant
appellee the benefits she seeks.”48
The Supreme Court reversed, not on the grounds that it was
inappropriate to estop the government in any case,49 but only that it
was inappropriate in this case particularly.50 The Court found that
the field representative’s failure to instruct Hansen to file an appli
cation (rather than, for example, preventing her from filing) fell
“far short” of the conduct that would require estoppel of the gov
ernment.51 The Court also voiced concerns about the potential for
crushing liability against the government if the circuit court’s deci
sion stood.52 Such liability would subject innumerable conversa
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 787.
45. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 946 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker,
450 U.S. 785.
46. See generally id. (holding that Hansen justifiably relied on the Government’s
conduct, which was unjustifiable).
47. Id. at 948.
48. Id.
49. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 788. “This Court has never decided what type of con
duct by a Government employee will estop the Government from insisting upon com
pliance with valid regulations governing the distribution of welfare benefits.” Id.
50. Id. at 790.
51. Id. at 789-90.
52. Id.
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tions between field representatives and citizens to scrutiny where
representatives did not precisely follow the lengthy SSA manual.53
Two justices dissented, calling attention to the fact that the ma
jority appeared to hastily overrule the court of appeals with little
factual basis to do so.54 The dissenting justices wrote of the impro
priety of the court’s issuance of a per curiam order in a case where
the law was far from settled. In their view, the ruling would only
serve to confusion among the lower courts.55
3. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford
County
Just two years after Hansen the Supreme Court again ex
amined this issue in Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County.56 The Court held that the federal government was not
estopped from recovering federal funds from a nonprofit provider
of health care services, despite the provider having been told orally
by the government that the expenditures were proper.57 The Court
ruled that the provider had not demonstrated that the traditional
elements of an estoppel were present, namely that money was im
properly disbursed to Heckler in the first instance. As a result,
Heckler could not have detrimentally relied on any government ad
vice.58 Heckler’s position had not changed.59 Recall, an estoppel
53. Id.
54. Id. at 791 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. In the words of the dissenting justices:
The apparent message of today’s decision—that we will know an estoppel
when we see one—provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts in an
area of the law that, contrary to the majority’s view, is far from settled . . . . I
believe that the majority, in its haste to reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, has simply added confusion to an already unsettled area by hinting,
but not deciding, that various factual nuances may be dispositive of estoppel
claims against the Government.
Id. at 792-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
This view was prescient. The confusion is exacerbated by the belief that “the doc
trine of equitable estoppel does apply to the government” as a result of the “almost
uniform support of decisions of the 1970s.” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 17.01, at 399 (1976). A few short years after Mr. Davis wrote
this, the Supreme Court hastily overturned the Second Circuit, suggesting this was a
settled area of law. However, the Court expressly recognized in its opinion that equita
ble estoppel was not settled. See infra Part I.A.4.
56. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
57. See id. at 53.
58. Id. at 62.
59. Id. at 59 (“[T]he party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its adver
sary’s conduct ‘in such a manner as to change his position for the worse.’”) (quoting 3 J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 805, at 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941)).
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may not occur even in a private context when these required ele
ments are not present.60
In dicta, the Court refused to place an absolute prohibition on
estoppel against the government, noting that there were indeed
cases in which the government should be estopped, albeit only
under a special set of circumstances left relatively undefined.61 Pur
suant to this language, a number of lower courts subsequently al
lowed estoppel against the government.62
4. Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond
In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, the plaintiff
was a welder for the Navy who had problems with his eyesight and
could no longer perform his duties.63 He was given a disability an
nuity yearly and honorably discharged.64 The statute regulating dis
ability pay for government employees stated that if he was restored
60.
61.

Id. at 61.
The Court explained:
When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct
of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a
whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined . . . . Petitioner urges us
to expand this principle into a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circum
stances run against the Government. We have left the issue open in the past,
and do so again today. Though the arguments the Government advances for
the rule are substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary to decide this
case, to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that
the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed
by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of de
cency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government.
Id. at 60-61. The Court also noted that “the hallmark of the [equitable estoppel] doc
trine is its flexible application.” Id. at 59.
62. Dicta such as this may have first appeared in Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S.
308, 314-15 (1961) (“[M]isconduct . . . might prevent the United States from relying on
petitioner’s foreign birth. In this situation, we need not stop to inquire whether, as
some lower courts have held, there may be circumstances in which the United States is
estopped . . . .”). This dicta is typical of subsequent Supreme Court cases. For an exam
ple of lower courts following this dicta, see Watkins v. U.S. Army, in which the court
stated that:
The Supreme Court has expressly left open the issue whether estoppel
may run against the government, refusing to hold “that there are no cases in
which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citi
zens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their
dealings with their Government.” . . . This is a case where equity cries out and
demands that the Army be estopped.
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Heckler, 467 U.S.
at 60-61) (holding the government estopped).
63. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 416 (1990).
64. Id.
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to his former earning capacity, he could no longer collect disabil
ity.65 “Restored” for the plaintiff meant having a job that paid him
eighty percent of his old welding salary.66 He then took a job as a
school bus driver.67 He was offered overtime and called the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) inquiring how much overtime he
could work and still collect disability.68 They responded with an
erroneously high number, and Richmond worked that number.69
The OPM discontinued his benefits; Richmond appealed.70
The United States Supreme Court decided the case on consti
tutional grounds,71 holding that the plaintiff’s claim for money was
in direct contravention to the statute on which his claim must rest.72
Estopping the government in this and similar situations was held to
be violative of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, which in
the plurality’s73 view must be interpreted to mean that “[h]owever
much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of
it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanc
tioned [by Congress].”74 Thus, the Court created a bright line rule
that the government cannot be estopped when the plaintiff is seek
ing a money claim from the government, unless Congress consents
to such an action through legislation.75 Such an estoppel would vio
65. 5 U.S.C. § 8337(d) (2006); Richmond, 496 U.S. at 417.
66. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 417.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 417-18.
70. Id. at 418.
71. “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appro
priations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See generally Paul F. Figley, The
Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1207 (2009).
72. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 424 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8337 (2006)).
73. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Scalia wrote for the majority
with Justices Blackmun and White concurring. Id. at 15. Justice Stevens concurred
only in judgment. Id. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Id.
74. Id. at 425 (quoting Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 291 (1851)). The Court
then continued:
[I]f the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right to them has so far
become vested in the United States that they can only be secured to the for
mer owner of the property through an act of Congress. Moneys once in the
treasury can only be withdrawn by an appropriation by law. . . . [J]udicial use
of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant respondent a money remedy
that Congress has not authorized.
Id. at 425-26 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 434. This rule was only advocated by the three justice plurality. Justices
Blackmun and White took issue with some of the Court’s spending analysis, while Jus
tice Stevens stated that “[t]he Appropriations Clause of the Constitution has nothing to
do with this case. Payments of pension benefits to retired and disabled federal servants
are made ‘in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law’ even if in particular cases
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late the Appropriations Clause, since it would be tantamount to the
court forcing the government to pay funds that Congress never ap
propriated; the court would impermissibly be drafting laws from the
bench.76 However, some lower courts have interpreted Richmond’s
holding to be much narrower.77
The Court also addressed whether a flat rule denying estoppel
against the government should exist, and again declined to make
such a rule:78
But it remains true that we need not embrace a rule that no es
toppel will lie against the Government in any case in order to
decide this case. We leave for another day whether an estoppel
claim could ever succeed against the Government. A narrower
ground of decision is sufficient to address the type of suit
presented here, a claim for payment of money from the Public
Treasury contrary to a statutory appropriation.79

This passage is reminiscent of those present in other rulings
concerning equitable estoppel against the government. In each in
stance that the court has addressed the estoppel issue, it has disthey are the product of a mistaken interpretation of a statute.” Id. at 435 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
The dissenting justices felt that the Appropriations Clause should not stand in the
way of a litigant’s attempt to collect funds from the government after it had been equi
tably estopped.
Although the Constitution generally forbids payments from the Treasury with
out a congressional appropriation, that proposition does not resolve this case.
Most fundamentally, Richmond’s collection of disability benefits would be
fully consistent with the relevant appropriation. And even if the majority is
correct that the statute cannot be construed to appropriate funds for claimants
in Richmond’s position, petitioner may nonetheless be estopped, on the basis
of its prelitigation conduct, from arguing that the Appropriations Clause bars
his recovery. Both the statutory construction and the estoppel arguments turn
on the equities, and the equities favor Richmond.
Id. at 437-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 985 F.2d
1574, 1581 (Fed Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Claims Court erred in concluding that Richmond
stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for
any monetary claim. The Richmond holding is not so broad. Richmond is limited to
‘claim[s] for the payment of money from the Public Treasury contrary to a statutory
appropriation.’”); see also United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“[Plaintiff]’s assertion of equitable estoppel . . . would have a negative impact on the
public fisc . . . this fact alone does not suffice to implicate the rule announced in
Richmond.”).
78. Although the Supreme Court has refused to estop the government in the
cases set forth here, they have held the government estopped (albeit under different
doctrinal labels). See infra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
79. Richmond, 496 U.S. at 423-24.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE104.txt

174

unknown

Seq: 12

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

6-SEP-11

16:53

[Vol. 33:163

posed of the claim on narrow grounds while declining to address
the situations in which the government should be estopped, aside
from imposing the affirmative misconduct requirement.
B. Cases in Which the Court May Have Held the Government
Estopped
1. Moser v. United States
In Moser v. United States, the petitioner was a Swiss national
who immigrated to the United States in 1937.80 He registered with
the Selective Service Agency in 1940, and then returned to Switzer
land to serve in the Swiss military.81 Following his service in Swit
zerland, he returned to the United States and married a U.S.
citizen, fathering three children with her.82 On January 11, 1944 he
was declared eligible for the draft.83 He sought aid from the Swiss
Legation, claiming that under the Treaty of 1850 he did not have to
join the U.S. military.84 At the time this deal was allowed under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, with the proviso that if
one exercised this right they could not become a United States citi
zen.85 After contacting the Swiss Legation, Moser informed the Lo
cal Board of the Selective Service Administration that he had been
“released unconditionally” from military service pursuant to the
treaty.86 After receiving Moser’s request, the Legation asked the
U.S. State Department to grant Moser this unconditional release.87
The Department then referred the matter to Moser’s Local Board,
which replied that Moser must complete a Form 301 which was re
vised to comply with the Treaty.88 This would grant him a draft
deferral.89 The Form was revised to exclude the provision that read
“I understand that the making of this application to be relieved
from such liability will debar me from becoming a citizen of the
United States”; language in conflict with the Treaty of 1850.90
Moser also received written assurances from the Swiss legation that
80. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 42 (1951).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The Treaty of 1850 provided that nationals of the United States and Switzer
land living in the opposite country were exempt from military service there. Id.
85. Id. at 42-43; see also 50 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1940).
86. Moser, 341 U.S. at 43.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 44.
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he would be allowed to apply for citizenship if he did not serve.91
Shortly thereafter, he applied for citizenship and was denied.92 The
Naturalization Service claimed he obtained Form 301 through
fraudulent mechanisms and in any event, that the Selective Service
Act superseded the Treaty of 1850.93 He sued, and in a sharply
worded opinion the district court held for Moser.94 However, this
ruling was reversed by the Second Circuit, which held that while the
Treaty of 1850 allowed Moser an exemption from military service, it
did not force the United States to grant him citizenship simply be
cause he had made this decision to take advantage of the
exemption.95
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that
Moser did not intelligently waive his rights.96 The Court also held,
like the district court, that if Moser believed he would be prevented
from obtaining citizenship by bypassing the draft, he would have
served in the American military.97
2. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.
United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.
(PICCO) was a case in which the United States prosecuted PICCO
for violating 13 U.S.C. § 407, which was enacted in 1899.98 The stat
ute prohibited dumping industrial refuse into navigable water
91. Id. at 43-44.
92. Id.
93. Petition of Moser, 85 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (D.N.Y. 1949).
94. Id. at 685.
[T]o me it seems that verbal gymnastics in this case become quite irrelevant.
Nothing could be clearer than the fact that our own State Department recog
nized the immunity that Moser had under the treaty. Nor could anything be
plainer, to me at least, than the fact that Moser never would have signed the
revised form D.S.S. 301 if it were to be treated as a waiver of naturalization in
the future . . . . I find as a fact that there never was a waiver of naturalization
by Moser and that the petition should be granted.
Id.
95. Petition of Moser, 182 F.2d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 1950) (“Even if ‘right to apply
for’ can be stretched to be synonymous with ‘right to obtain’ citizenship that would not
bind this government.”).
96. Moser, 341 U.S. at 47 (holding that “nothing less than an intelligent waiver is
required by elementary fairness”). In reality, the Court dismissed the estoppel issue in
a rather cursory manner, stating, “[t]here is no need to evaluate these circumstances on
the basis of any estoppel of the Government or the power of the Swiss Legation to bind
the United States by its advice to petitioner. Petitioner did not knowingly and inten
tionally waive his rights to citizenship.” Id.
97. Id.
98. Currently codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).
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ways.99 Section 407 also provided that “‘the Secretary of the Army
. . . may permit the deposit’ of refuse matter deemed by the Army
Corps of Engineers not to be injurious to navigation, ‘provided ap
plication is made to [the Secretary] prior to depositing such mate
rial.’”100 PICCO dumped waste products into a river without
seeking a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers, but this was
because no permit program was established until December of
1970, seventy-one years after Section 407 was enacted.101
At trial, the district court refused to admit evidence both that
the permit program was not in existence at the time of the alleged
offenses and that the Army Corps of Engineers misled PICCO to
believe that a permit was not needed for Section 407 compliance.102
The Third Circuit reversed the district court, which held that the
Section 13 prohibition was operative in the absence of the requisite
formalized permit procedures.103
Relevant to estoppel, the Supreme Court held the district
court’s refusal to admit PICCO’s evidence to be erroneous, explain
ing that this prevented PICCO from mounting an adequate de
fense.104 In addition, the Court noted that the Army Corps of
Engineers had always interpreted Section 407 to apply to industrial
effluents that obstruct waterways, not refuse that caused no harm to
ships in transit.105 The Court further remarked that it was correct
for PICCO to look for the Army Corps of Engineers regulations for
guidance.106 The Court then held, “Thus, to the extent that the reg
ulations deprived PICCO of fair warning as to what conduct the
Government intended to make criminal, we think there can be no
doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of

99. Id.
100. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 658 (1973) (quoting
original statute codified at § 13, the Court notes that the Secretary’s authority to issue
permits under § 13 was terminated on October 18, 1972); 33 U.S.C. § 407.
101. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 660 n.9.
102. Id. at 661.
103. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 476 (3d Cir. 1972).
104. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 670.
105. The regulations stated: “Section 13 of the River and Harbor Act of March 3,
1899 authorizes the Secretary of the Army to permit the deposit of refuse matter in
navigable waters, whenever in the judgment of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and
navigation will not be injured thereby . . . .” Id. at 673 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.200(e)(2)
(1969)).
106. Id. at 674.
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criminal justice prevent the Government from proceeding with the
prosecution.”107
Many commentators have expressed the view that Moser and
PICCO were cases decided on equitable estoppel grounds despite
the fact that the Court did not say so expressly.108 These scholars
reason that the situations presented were decisions in which the es
toppel doctrine could have readily been invoked.109 Indeed, the
lower court decisions in both cases spoke about estoppel as it ap
plied to these litigants.110
It appears that confusion about the precedential value of these
decisions befuddles even the justices themselves. In Richmond,
Justice White wrote “[PICCO] may well have been decided on the
basis of estoppel.”111 Likewise, in Heckler Justice Rehnquist
seemed similarly confused about the Supreme Court’s sanction of
the use of estoppel.112
107. Id. The Court then cited two law review articles about the application of
equitable estoppel against the government, supporting the view of some commentators
that the Court had equitable estoppel in mind when rendering this decision. Id.; see
Frank C. Newman, Note, Should Official Advice Be Reliable? —Proposals as to Estop
pel and Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953); Note,
Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L. J. 1046 (1969).
108. See, e.g., Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Ob
ject: Estoppel Remedies for an Agency’s Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Mis
conduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653, 730 (1992) (“In PICCO, as in Moser, the problem for
the scholar is to account for the dramatically different approach used by the Court to
address what is analytically an estoppel problem.”); Frederick W. Blumenschein, Note,
Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 423, 435 (1981).
109. See Schwartz, supra note 108, at 730; Blumenschein, supra note 108, at 435
n.50.
110. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 480 (3d Cir.
1972), rev’d, 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); Petition of Moser, 182 F.2d 734, 738 (2d Cir.
1950), rev’d sub nom. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 47 (1951). Of course, one
reason the Court may not have couched the decision in estoppel terms is to prevent
future litigants from pointing to these decisions as Supreme Court acceptance of the
invocation of the doctrine.
111. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 434 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring).
112. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 61
n.12 (1984) (“In fact, at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the
Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm
a private party as a result of governmental deception.”); see also Nagle v. ActonBoxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
almost never estopped the government–outside of criminal cases or deportation.”);
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1973) (“We think the
estoppel doctrine is applicable to the United States where justice and fair play require
it. The Supreme Court applied this rationale in Moser v. United States . . . .”); Griffin v.
Reich, 956 F.Supp. 98, 107 (D. R.I 1997) (discussing how PICCO and Moser may have
been decided on equitable estoppel grounds). Contra Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942,
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GOVERNMENT

THE

Addressing the ambiguity created by the Supreme Court, com
mentators have proposed various techniques to prevent most cir
cumstances of grave injustice, but which also seek to avoid many of
the negative effects associated with estopping the government. The
following section analyzes and synthesizes the views of these
commentators.
A. Proprietary Capacity
Many courts and commentators have suggested that when the
federal government is acting in its proprietary function,113 it is act
ing much the same as private market participants and therefore
should be estopped like a private entity.114 There are two ways in
which the government acts in a proprietary capacity. The first in
volves a situation where the federal government is providing an es
sential service because there is not a strong enough profit potential
for private actors to do so.115 The second is when it is essentially
competing like other private actors.116
There are plentiful and often straightforward justifications for
estopping the government in these situations. Obviously, it is law
ful for private parties to be estopped in instances where their con
duct satisfies the elements of equitable estoppel. When the
government acts in this manner, it is at no greater a risk of incurring
liability than the private litigant. For example, Fed Ex and the
950 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450
U.S. 785 (1982) (“While some courts and commentators have sought to find a contrary
indication [that the Supreme Court did hold the government estopped] in Moser v.
United States, this is an instance of the wish being father to the thought.”).
113. As opposed to its “sovereign” function. See John F. Conway, Note, Equita
ble Estoppel of the Federal Government: An Application of the Proprietary Function
Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 707 (1987).
114. For an example of this view, see United States v. Georgia Pacific Co., 421
F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1970) (“The growth of government and the concomitant increase in its
functions, power and contacts with private parties has made many courts increasingly
reluctant to deny the defense of equitable estoppel in appropriate situations.”). The
court then held the government could be estopped because it was seeking enforcement
of a contract made with a private party. Id. at 100. That is, the parties’ relationship was
substantially similar to those of two private parties contracting. Id.
115. This is often referred to as “proprietary in form.” See Conway, supra note
113, at 720. Government operation of Amtrak is an example of “proprietary in form”
action.
116. This is often referred to as “proprietary in fact.” Id. at 720. An example of
this is the United States Postal Service. Id. at 720.
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United Parcel Service both have extensive, nationwide operations
with many agents, perhaps more so than the United States Postal
Service. There are likely comparable opportunities for the Postal
Service and these private carriers to incur liability. In the view of
proponents advocating the proprietary exception to the longstand
ing doctrine against estoppel of the government, it is fundamentally
unfair if the government can escape liability while private carriers
are left paying damages for similar acts.
Many of these reasons have been judicially recognized for at
least the past eighty years.117 The “proprietary capacity” idea has
increasingly gained acceptance.118 Of course, not all courts have
followed this model.119
B. Procedural Estoppel
Numerous courts and other observers have also noted a differ
ence between estopping the government’s conduct by demanding it
to provide a benefit to the plaintiff that they were never in fact
entitled to receive, and estopping the government when it did not
follow its own rules and regulations.120 The latter is known as “pro
cedural” rather than “substantive” estoppel.121 Merrill provides an
example of substantive estoppel where claimants sought to invoke
estoppel to recover insurance benefits to which they believed they
were entitled as a result of government miscommunication.122
117. The Falcon, 19 F.2d 1009, 1014 (D. Md. 1927) (“Estoppels against the public
are perhaps not as readily granted as against private individuals, but it has been decided
frequently that the public may estop itself by acts done in its proprietary capacity . . . .
[W]hen a sovereignty submits itself to the jurisdiction of a court of equity . . . its claims
and rights are adjudicable by every other principle and rule of equity applicable to the
claims and rights of private parties under similar circumstances.”).
118. Accord Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 682 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1982) (find
ing issuance of permits for developers’ dredge and fill activities is unquestionably an
exercise of the government’s sovereign power and therefore not subject to estoppel);
see also Meister Bros. v. Macy, 674 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding equitable
estoppel may lie against government when agency was engaged in essentially a private
business); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding
proprietary character of government activity militates in favor of allowing estoppel).
See generally Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Precision Small Engines, 227 F.3d 224,
228 (4th Cir. 2000).
119. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Roldan Fonseca, 795 F.2d 1102, 1108 (1st Cir. 1986)
(finding no merit in argument that proprietary nature of government activity justifies
assertion of equitable estoppel against it); see also Phelps v. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency,
785 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1986).
120. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 113, at 707.
121. Id. at 717-19.
122. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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There, the farmers sought the proceeds on their crop insurance, a
benefit that they were never actually entitled to, yet believed they
were because they were informed by the FCIC that their crop was
insurable.123
Schweiker v. Hansen was an example of a procedural estoppel
claim.124 The Second Circuit in Hansen v. Harris ruled that the
plaintiff should not bear the costs of the SSA’s errors because the
SSA officer’s misconduct resulted from a failure to follow clearly
written guidelines in the SSA field representative’s manual.125 Had
the field representative followed these guidelines, Hansen would
have received the benefits to which she was entitled.126 Because
the government agent’s failure to follow clearly promulgated guide
lines resulted in an injustice to the private litigant, the Second Cir
cuit held the government estopped.127
Proponents of this view favor estopping the government when
it commits a procedural error because claimants are denied benefits
that they are actually entitled to through no fault of their own.128
In addition, Congress purposefully allocated resources for people in
the benefit-receiving class, thus showing a congressional belief that
it is socially desirable that members of that class receive these bene
fits.129 A policy that essentially results in permitting government
agents to ignore rules frustrates the congressional purpose of pro
viding benefits to people like Hansen.130 Finally, failing to estop
the government in cases such as this encourages laziness and lacka
daisical behavior, and diminishes accountability in communication
123. Id. at 382-83.
124. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1982); see supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
127. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker,
450 U.S. at 790 (“[O]ur holding of estoppel under these circumstances is limited to the
situation where (a) a procedural not a substantive requirement is involved and (b) an
internal procedural manual or guide or some other source of objective standards of
conduct exists and supports an inference of misconduct by a Government employee.”).
The Supreme Court rejected this rationale in Schweiker. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 788.
128. See generally Peter Raven-Hansen, Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their
Own “Laws”, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985).
129. Hansen, 619 F.2d at 962 (Newman, J., concurring), rev’d sub nom.
Schweiker, 450 U.S. 785 (stating that estopping the government in this case “does not
drain the public fisc of one dollar that is being spent either in excess of anticipated
benefit levels or contrary to a substantive policy decision of the Congress”).
130. Id. at 948 (majority opinion).
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between government officials and the citizenry, threatening public
trust in their government.131
C. Affirmative Misconduct
In yet another attempt to develop an approach that would pre
vent injustice while remaining cognizant of the concerns underlying
the general rule against estopping the government, most courts
have held that the government may only be estopped when its
agent engages in some sort of “affirmative misconduct.”132 Mere
negligence will not suffice to estop the government.133
It is often difficult to determine what sort of conduct consti
tutes “affirmative misconduct.” Courts usually determine if con
duct is “affirmative” on a case-by-case basis, and have refused to set
forth a definite test.134 Indeed, some courts have held that the gov
ernment may not be estopped procedurally because failure to fol
low internal guidelines does not constitute affirmative
misconduct.135
Supreme Court case law supports the affirmative misconduct
requirement. The Court first touched on the affirmative miscon
duct requirement in Montana v. Kennedy.136 In Kennedy, the peti
tioner had an American-born mother and an Italian father.137 He
was born while his parents were temporarily living in Italy.138 Prior
to his birth, an American Consular Officer told his mother that she
could not return to the United States because she was pregnant,
and the United States did not issue passports to pregnant wo
men.139 However, the U.S. did not require that citizens have pass
ports when they were returning to the U.S. at the time of the
131. See generally Raven-Hansen, supra note 128, at 73-75.
132. See, e.g., INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Montana v. Ken
nedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961).
133. See de la Fuente v. F.D.I.C., 332 F.3d 1208, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003).
134. See, e.g., Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d 236, 241 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1991)
(noting that “[The Supreme Court’s] opinions have mentioned the possibility that some
type of affirmative governmental conduct might give rise to estoppel” (emphasis ad
ded)). At the very most, courts have employed guidance similar to that stated in Pur
cell v. United States. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
135. See Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 976 F.2d 934, 938 (5th
Cir. 1992) (stating that “‘more than mere negligence, delay, inaction, or failure to fol
low an internal agency guideline’” is required for establishing an equitable estoppel
claim (quoting Mangaroo v. Nelson, 864 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1989))).
136. Kennedy, 366 U.S. at 308.
137. Id. at 309.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 314.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE104.txt

182

unknown

Seq: 20

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

6-SEP-11

16:53

[Vol. 33:163

petitioner’s birth.140 Petitioner sought, inter alia, to estop the gov
ernment from denying birth citizenship because of this misrepresen
tation.141 The Court ruled that the officer’s faulty advice142 “falls
far short of misconduct such as might prevent the United States
from relying on petitioner’s foreign birth.”143
Twelve years after Kennedy, INS v. Hibi 144 involved the pas
sage of a 1940 statute through which a Philippine-born serviceman
sought benefits.145 The Act allowed for foreign-born members of
the U.S. military to be granted citizenship without requiring them
to undergo residency and literacy requirements they would other
wise need.146
Seventeen years after the application deadline passed, peti
tioner’s visa expired.147 He argued that the government failed to
provide a naturalization representative in the Philippines, or publi
cize this benefit to servicemen in any way.148 The Court held that
this too fell short of the affirmative misconduct needed to estop the
government.149

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The officer simply stated, “I am sorry, Mrs., you cannot [return to the United
States] in that condition.” Id. at 314.
143. Id. at 314-15.
144. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 6, 8; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002, 1005 (repealed 1952).
146. Nationality Act of 1940 § 701, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 (repealed 1952); see also Hibi,
414 U.S. at 7 n.8.
147. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 7.
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id. at 8-9. Accord INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam). In Mi
randa, a foreign-born man had married a naturalized U.S. citizen. Id. at 14. At the
time of the marriage, respondent’s wife filed a visa petition with the INS on respon
dent’s behalf requesting that he be granted an immigrant visa as her spouse. Id. at 15.
Miranda also filed an application requesting the INS to adjust his status to that of a
permanent resident alien. Id. The INS took no action for eighteen months. Id. Re
spondent’s marriage failed, and his ex-wife withdrew her application. Id. When re
spondent’s application was then processed, it was denied “because he had not shown an
immigrant visa was . . . available to him.” Id.
An immigration judge ordered Miranda deported. Id. at 15-16. He appealed, and
the Board of Immigration Appeals judge denied his estoppel claim, reasoning the gov
ernment’s actions were not an affirmative misconduct. Id. at 16. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, stating they believed the government’s actions were affirmative. Id. The Su
preme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the circuit court in light
of their opinion in Hansen. Id. The Ninth Circuit again ruled that the government’s
misconduct was affirmative, and the Supreme Court again disagreed. Id. at 19.
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Justice Douglas’s dissent150 viewed the facts very differently,
focusing on some facts that he felt the Court had ignored.151 The
failure to provide a naturalization agent was not an omission by the
government.152 Instead, it was the consequence of an act taken by
the Executive Branch. The Filipino government feared the applica
tion of the provision of the Serviceman’s Act that authorized natu
ralization of those Filipinos who served alongside U.S. soldiers in
the Second World War into the United States.153 The Filipino gov
ernment feared that young men, upon gaining American citizen
ship, would flee the country. They asked the Attorney General to
revoke the Vice-Consul’s authority to naturalize Filipino ex-service
men, and he so allowed.154 This left no naturalization representa
tive in the Philippines to enforce the Congressional mandate that
these Filipino soldiers have the opportunity to become U.S. citi
zens, even though Congress clearly intended for naturalization
agents to be present in the Philippines to naturalize these men.155
Hibi could not have been naturalized even had he known about the
program, or if he had tried.156 In Justice Douglas’s view, this be
havior constituted a “deliberate—and successful—effort on the part
of agents of the Executive Branch to frustrate the congressional
purpose and to deny substantive rights to Filipinos such as respon
dent by administrative fiat.”157 Justice Douglas then noted, “The
record does not support [the] conclusion,” apparently reached by
the majority, “that there was no affirmative misconduct involved in
this case.”158
Naturally, an “affirmative” misconduct requirement serves to
defray endless liability concerns. Negligence in communication
usually involves a misunderstanding by the party relying on the
communication. That is, the communicator said something in a way
that caused a second party to misunderstand, while the communica
tor had a good faith belief that the second party’s understanding
was correct. Conversely, courts often find “affirmative misconduct”
when the government has reason to believe it has communicated
150. Joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 9-11 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 10-11.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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misinformation, and has done so as part of an ongoing series of
misrepresentations or distortions against the suing party.159 How
ever, many courts have found that affirmative misconduct by the
government can occur even without the intent to mislead.160
D. Actual Authority
As a general rule, the government cannot be estopped when a
particular agent is acting outside the scope of his authority.161 This
is true where the agent’s authority is apparent or clearly ultra
vires.162 In fact, many courts have held that a government agent
may never be bound by apparent authority, because any agent of
the government would always appear to have authority, at least to
an unsophisticated party.163 Apparent authority is, therefore, too
dependent on the private litigant’s subjective belief.164 The scope
of a government agent’s authority is critical because the existence
of actual authority is a prerequisite to equitably estopping the
government.165
159. See Purcell v. United States, 1 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 1993). “Affirmative
misconduct involves ‘ongoing active misrepresentations’ or a ‘pervasive pattern of false
promises’” as opposed to “an isolated act of providing misinformation.” Id. (quoting
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 708 (9th Cir. 1989)).
160. See, e.g., Watkins, 875 F.2d at 707 (citing Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d
1064, 1067 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)); Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 573 F.
Supp. 2d 311, 327 (D. Me. 2008), aff’d, 585 F.3d 495 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Watkins, 875
F.2d at 707 (en banc)).
161. This rule has been in existence for hundreds of years. See Lee v. Munroe, 7
Cranch 366, 367 (1813) (“[The] United States is not bound by the declarations of their
agent, founded upon a mistake of fact, unless it clearly appears that the agent was act
ing within the scope of his authority, and was empowered in his capacity of agent to
make such declaration.”).
162. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70 (1940) (“An officer or agency of
the United States to whom no administrative authority has been delegated cannot estop
the United States even by an affirmative undertaking to waive or surrender a public
right.” (citing Utah v. United States, 284 U.S. 534, 545-46 (1932)). “Ultra Vires” is Latin
for “beyond the powers (of)” and means “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power
allowed or granted by . . . law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1662.
163. See Randy L. Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly: Estopping the
United States, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 41, 54-55 (1982).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1958) (“[A]pparent
authority exists only with regard to those who believe and have reason to believe that
there is authority.”) Indeed, apparent authority has often been labeled a misnomer, as
in order for authority to be “apparent” authority does not exist at all. See Pitou, supra
note 6, at 632-33.
165. See Urban Data Sys. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1147, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(quoting Yosemite Park & Curry v. United States, 552 F.2d 552, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(“[T]he United States will not be estopped to deny the acts of its agents who have acted
beyond the scope of their actual authority.”).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE104.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 23

ESTOPPING BIG BROTHER

6-SEP-11

16:53

185

This is because if a government agent acts outside the bounds
of his authority, he is effectively re-writing legislation to give him
self authority he does not have. Imposing an estoppel in these in
stances would be tantamount to the court condoning this behavior,
resulting in a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine.166
Stated another way, if the court enforces the unauthorized ac
tion taken by the government agent, the court is recognizing the
agent’s power to engage in the conduct upon which the private liti
gant alleges he or she detrimentally relied. Since this power was
not given to the particular agent by Congress, judges that uphold
this exercise are legislating to give effect to the agents’ ultra vires
acts.167
166. See, e.g., United States v. 18.16 Acres of Land, 598 F. Supp. 282, 288
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (“Using the unauthorized actions of a government representative as
the basis for estopping the government effectively circumvents a statutory or regulatory
mandate, and can effectively waive a statutory or regulatory requirement.”). This mir
rors the rationale in Richmond, but here the court is only sanctioning the acts of the
government agent, who is the “legislations” drafter (although the ability to “draft” is
enabled by the Court). Compare Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423
25 (1990), with United States v. 18.16 Acres of Land, 598 F. Supp. at 288. In a Rich
mond situation, the court would be “writing” the legislation itself, for example, by im
properly appropriating money, a power vested in Congress. See Richmond, 496 U.S. at
424-25 In other words, in a Richmond situation, the court is not excusing the acts of the
agent, and allowing the government to recover resulting in a separation of powers viola
tion, while in this situation the court is enforcing the effect of the agent’s ultra vires act,
which similarly results in a violation.
167.
See, e.g., Pitou, supra note 6, at 629.
Administrators are clothed with authority to act and make rules by the exer
cise of legislative powers; and such legislative power is exercisable only by
Congress. It cannot be exercised by an administrator; no administrator may
do that which is forbidden, nor exercise a power that was withheld. The fact
that a citizen was injured by his action does not clothe an administrator with
legislative power, i.e., with the power to assume an authority that has been
withheld or prohibited.
Id. Fred Ansell points out that:
The application of the doctrine of separation of powers to estoppel against the
government is straightforward. If the government is estopped as a result of
unauthorized government action, congressional power to legislate under arti
cle I is undermined: in effect, courts would be refusing to apply the law as
enacted by Congress because an executive branch official has misrepresented
the content of the law to the citizen. Estoppel would endorse the decisions of
executive agents that are contrary to congressional commands and directives.
The executive branch would be refashioning the law through its errors in indi
vidual cases, thus contravening the separation of powers.
Fred Ansell, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive Rule of Equi
table Estoppel Against the Government, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026, 1037 (1986). Peter
Raven-Hansen agrees:
When a court imposes an estoppel, it sets aside the agency action taken in
violation of agency law. The estoppel therefore may at least temporarily block

R
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The threshold determination of whether the government agent
was acting within his authority is often difficult to determine be
cause courts use varying tests. Some courts use an approach where
an agent is authorized to do only that which is specifically delegated
to him or her by statute, regulation, or warrant of authority.168
Other courts use a more nebulous test that asks the question “is the
agent’s action within the scope of his official duties?”169
E. Lazy FC Balancing
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch is a Ninth Circuit case in which
the court of appeals allowed the government to be equitably es
topped.170 In its opinion, the court attempted to fashion a workable
test for when the government should be estopped. The dispute in
Lazy FC was whether the United States was entitled to recover
money erroneously paid to members of a ranch partnership.171 An
agent of the U.S. Department of Agriculture informed the partner
ship that they were able to receive payments if they divided opera
tions so as to appear like separate producers.172 Government
regulations at the time supported this, but the regulations were sub
sequently changed to prohibit it.173 The ranch continued operating
as it had before, and it kept receiving payments, which were part of
a USDA program that allowed for payments to certain farmers for
taking their land out of production, under the pre-existing arrangethe agency’s enforcement of legislative policy against the party invoking estop
pel, confer benefits on the party that are not authorized by legislative policy,
or otherwise give effect to an incorrect interpretation of the governing law.
The separation of powers objection to equitable estoppel of the government is
that a court, by estopping the agency in such cases, effectively “legislates” a
change or waiver of governing law or forces the agency to do the same, invad
ing Congress’ exclusive constitutional authority to make law.
Raven-Hansen, supra note 128, at 1, 33-34 (footnotes omitted); accord Portmann v.
United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1982) (“One such justification invoked a
separation of powers rationale; proponents argued that permitting equitable estop
pel against the government would, in effect, allow government employees to ‘legislate’
by misinterpreting or ignoring an applicable statute or regulation. Judicial validation of
such unauthorized ‘legislation,’ it was claimed, would infringe upon Congress’ exclusive
constitutional authority to make law.”).
168. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 420 (1990); Floyd
Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 676-77 (1868).
169. See, e.g., Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 681 F.2d 746,
748 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
170. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1973).
171. Id. at 987.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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ment.174 The USDA informed the ranch that this was permissible,
and assisted the farmers in their application to the program.175
Later, regulations governing this program had changed, making the
ranch ineligible.176 However, the ranch continued to receive pay
ment. The government acquiesced, but later demanded a return of
its money.177 The State Committee of the Agricultural Stabilization
& Conservation Service determined that the partnership had not
engaged in a scheme to defraud the government, and recommended
that the partnership retain the payments received.178 However,
even though the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to allow
the ranch to keep the payments for equity reasons, he chose not to
do so and the government filed suit.179 The ranch partners relied
on an estoppel defense.180
The court ruled that the ranchers were entitled to keep funds
received, because ruling otherwise would lead to a serious injustice
to the plaintiffs, and the “public policy of the United States would
[not] be significantly frustrated by permitting the partners to retain
the additional payments.”181 This marked the adoption of a balanc
ing approach by the Ninth Circuit182 that essentially advocated
weighing the amount of injury the government would suffer if the
government were not estopped.183 The court explicitly stated that
private litigants could evoke estoppel even if the government was
acting in its sovereign rather than proprietary capacity.184 It did,
however, state that courts should be more reluctant to estop the

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 988.
181. Id. at 990.
182. The court did not explicitly call it this. Id. at 985.
183. Id. at 988 (“We think the estoppel doctrine is applicable to the United States
where justice and fair play require it.”).
184. Id. at 989.
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government when it is acting in a sovereign capacity.185 Many
courts have followed the Lazy FC court’s lead.186
III.

SHORTCOMINGS

OF THESE

PROPOSALS

The number of proposed situations in which commentators
have suggested that the government should be estopped illustrates
the difficulty in devising an immaculate test that would prevent in
justice to private litigants while remaining sensitive to concerns un
derlying the traditional no-estoppel rule. Indeed, while many of
these tests forward the interests of justice in a particular case, they
ignore the public policy concerns behind the no-estoppel rule.
Thus, there are serious drawbacks to all of these tests which will be
explored in this Part.
A. Proprietary Capacity
The benefits of the “proprietary capacity” test are clear.187
However, it suffers from a number of defects. For example, al
lowing claims against the government when it is acting in its propri
etary capacity will still harm the public fisc, as money claims would
be paid out to litigants. Also, although some courts interpret Rich
mond differently,188 Richmond bars invoking the equitable estop
pel doctrine when it may result in paying money to the private
litigant.189 As already seen, actions involving property are likely to
involve a financial component that would necessitate money being
185. Id. The court also noted facts in the case that qualified as affirmative miscon
duct, although again the court did not expressly use these words. The court stated:
The partnership would not have entered into the soil bank program had it not
been for the advice and assistance of [the USDA agent] . . . . At the time the
partners entered into the contracts, even the agency’s published regulations
arguably permitted this type of arrangement. Moreover, not only did the part
ners rely on the government’s approval of their contracts but . . . the Ranch
requested permission to terminate the contracts. At this time, the more com
plete regulations had been published and it was clear that the arrangement
was improper, but the government never apprised the partnership of this, and
in fact refused permission to terminate the agreements.
Id. at 989-90.
186. See, e.g., Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1982);
Clinger v. Farm Serv. Agency, No. CV 04 424 E BLW, 2006 WL 581192, at *5 (D.
Idaho Mar. 8, 2006); Dempsey v. Dir. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency, 549 F. Supp. 1334,
1339 (E.D. Ark. 1982); Ex parte Four Seasons, Ltd., 450 So. 2d 110, 111 (Ala. 1984).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
189. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423-25 (1990).
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awarded to the victor from the federal treasury, a result prohibited
by Richmond.190
Furthermore, because of the vast resources of the federal gov
ernment the number of government contracts granted are much
greater than any single private entity’s (such as Fed Ex) both in
number and amount.191 That is, they are exposed to a much greater
level of liability than any private entity would ever bear. The sheer
mass of the government’s dealings would imperil the public fisc to
an unreasonable degree under this approach.
B. Procedural Estoppel
Again, estopping the government when it fails to follow its own
rules is a well-thought-out idea firmly rooted in logic. However, the
procedural estoppel rule is very limited in scope and application,
and leaves ample opportunity for injustices to occur which may be
as serious as if this rule were never invoked. In effect, it rewards
litigants who were fortunate enough to have the agent involved in
their interaction violate a procedural rule, leaving those without
this fortune wanting.
Furthermore, this test assumes that government agents may be
more culpable because they did not follow a promulgated rule or
regulation, but this is not necessarily so. It is hardly reasonable for
every agent of the government to have knowledge of every rule in
oft-voluminous regulation manuals.
Additionally, imposing liability on the government through its
agents could discourage candidness. Liability for government
agents flowing from faulty advice would discourage government
agents from providing any advice at all. When faced with a decision
to either provide advice for which the government could face liabil
ity or refuse to advise (or advise citizens to consult a document),
the agents may choose the latter to protect themselves, especially
when disregarding an arcane rule can be the source of the liability.
Candidness is an attribute that people seek from a government
agent from whom they want advice.
190. Id. at 424-25.
191. In the 2009 fiscal year the government awarded $409,677,980,249 in con
tracts. USASpending.gov, http://www.usaspending.gov/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). Pre
sumably, this number is actually much larger when money at stake is taken into account
in contracts that are more informal, such as that at issue in Richmond.
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C. Affirmative Misconduct
The affirmative misconduct requirement is weak in that deter
mining what conduct is “affirmative” (rather than passive malfea
sance which would constitute negligence) is a difficult task. The
line between what constitutes an “act” or “omission” is often
thin.192 While in some areas of law this determination is unavoida
ble, in many cases it makes scant sense for the hinges of justice to
swing on such an unsteady ground. This should be evaded when
possible. Additionally, limiting liability to affirmative acts surely
decreases findings of malfeasance. This incentivizes weak decisionmaking in the government by impeding government agents from
proactively seeking to advise citizens, ultimately making their lives
easier (and thus fulfilling their function).
Beyond this, the affirmative misconduct requirement is deserv
ing of little criticism unless used alone; it is not encompassing
enough—an offense of which all current approaches are guilty.
This test serves mainly as a means to limit the government’s liabil
ity. If this requirement did not exist, a government agent’s words
could be misinterpreted by the citizen seeking advice, and that citi
zen could act in a manner detrimental to him or herself while rely
ing on this advice.193 A jury would likely find the citizen’s reliance
reasonable because of the carelessness in which the advice was
communicated. The lack of an affirmative misconduct requirement
would certainly subject the government to a high risk of liability in
nearly every transaction between a citizen and a government agent.
Of the proposed tests, the affirmative misconduct requirement is
surely the most reliable, and has enjoyed widespread acceptance by
the courts.194
D. Actual Authority
While the rationale behind this rule is that a government agent
cannot perform acts on behalf of the government for which he is
not statutorily authorized,195 the presence of this rule has the per
192. See, e.g., Jacob Kreutzer, Note, Causation And Repentance: Reexamining
Complicity in Light of Attempts Doctrine, 3 N.Y.U J. L. & LIBERTY 155 (2008); Arthur
Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 547 (1988);
Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor
and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2002).
193. Indeed, the Supreme Court warns about “real and imagined claims of misin
formation.” Richmond, 496 U.S. at 433.
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. See supra Part II.D.
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verse effect of subjecting unsophisticated citizens to injustice be
cause of their failure to inquire into the powers of a particular
agent. While many courts hold that litigants cannot reasonably rely
on statements of a person who has no governmental authority,196
this too rests on the assumption that the litigant had reason to know
or cause to investigate what the agent’s authority actually was.
Weighing the equities, traditional notions of justice suggest that the
citizen should not be the party punished for relying on statements
of a government official, which in many cases could be conveyed
over the phone, in mail, or in electronic mail. These media further
the unlikelihood that it would even occur to a citizen that the per
son with whom they dealt with was not authorized to act or advise
as they did. Even if the citizen exercised the utmost diligence and
endeavored to determine the scope of the agent’s authority with
whom they spoke, it would undoubtedly be a Herculean task.197 In
fact, oftentimes the agents themselves may be unaware that they do
not have the authority which they purport to have, further compli
cating the ability of citizens to discover if the agent’s advice ex
ceeded his or her authority.198
E. Lazy FC Balancing
The weakness in the Lazy FC balancing test is that it can lead
to disparate results because the test itself provides little guidance.199
This test requires little more than making an equitable judgment as
a court would when judging a case litigated between private par
ties.200 In an equity case litigated between two private parties, a
court would consider the relative harm of the injury done to one
196. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
197. Courts show little sympathy to those embroiled in this plight. See, e.g., Fed.
Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (“[A]nyone entering into an ar
rangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he
who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority.”);
Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Min. of Def. of Rep. of Venez., 575 F.3d 491, 500
(5th Cir. 2009); Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 449 (11th Cir.
1982); In Re Estate of Hooper, 359 F.2d 569, 578 (3d Cir. 1966); Gov’t of the V.I. v.
Gordon, 244 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1957).
198. See Monarch Assur. P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited
by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is
so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon
his authority.” (emphasis added)).
199. Indeed, this runs contrary to the very purpose of the doctrine of stare decisis
which is “designed to promote stability and certainty in the law.” Hubbard v. United
States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (1995).
200. See supra Part II.E.
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party versus the other, as well as the interests of the public at
large.201 In effect, this test is nothing but a more lenient standard of
the Supreme Court’s jus aequum rule.202 Lazy FC balancing is
hardly different from the test the court espouses when it advocates
that courts should “permit[ ] the estoppel defense against the gov
ernment in cases where basic notions of fairness require[ ] us to do
so.”203
Furthermore, it is foreseeable that widespread application of
this test would cause courts to cease being sensitive to the issues
that created the no-estoppel rule. What in individual cases may
seem like a grave injustice may serve a greater social good when
viewed holistically. In their treatise on Administrative Law, Profes
sors Davis and Pierce illustrate this problem. They state:
[The Internal Revenue Service] is one of the federal agen
cies that is most respected for its competence. Yet, each year the
General Accounting Office (GAO) conducts a study of the tax
payer advice provided by the IRS, and each year that study
shows that IRS gives erroneous advice in somewhere between 10
and 20 percent of all cases. Some taxpayers are injured by reli
ance on IRS’ advice, but millions of taxpayers are benefited by its
availability.204

Balancing the equities in instances where erroneous advice was
given would inevitably favor the private litigant at some point if the
Lazy FC test was commonly used. As professors Pierce and Davis
intimate, if these rulings adverse to the IRS became common
enough, it would soon encourage the IRS to limit its advice or
spend more taxpayer money on costly training. This would limit
the valuable social good provided by the IRS; indeed, a service the
citizenry demands.

201. See Barnes v. E-Systems, Inc. Group Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501
U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1990)).
202. Jus Aequum is defined as “law characterized by equity, flexibility, and adap
tation to the circumstances of a particular case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 2, at 461.
203. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973).
204. K.C. DAVIS & R.J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 229-30 (3d
ed. 1994).
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HOLE—A NEW TEST

A. The Need for a Complementary Test
The presence of the numerous tests that courts have developed
for deciding whether to estop the government illustrates the diffi
culty of creating a test that would result in the just disposition of all
estoppel cases. If applied alone, all of these approaches will inevi
tably work substantial injustices. Rather than have each test de
scribed above function as independent “tests,” the separate tests
should instead function as numerous factors to be considered within
one test. These factors205 must be balanced against one another as
the particular factual situation demands. They must not be applied
in a vacuum, as if the options before the court are to follow the
traditional no-estoppel rule or estop based on consideration of a
single factor, as is the case in many courts today.206 Courts should
apply each test with the other tests in mind, in order to create a
“net” that would catch litigants as justice applied to their case.
Considering these factors when deciding an estoppel case against
the government would, when taken together, create an effective
guide for courts to determine estoppel cases fairly.
However, these factors alone are not sufficient to serve justice.
In combination with these other views, courts should also consider
whether the government’s actions allowed it to substantially under
mine the core legislative purpose of the statute in question. This
idea would create a multi-factor test that courts should consider
when determining whether the government should be estopped:
(1) whether the traditional elements of estoppel are present;
(2) whether the government was acting in its proprietary or
sovereign capacity;
(3) whether the government agent broke or disregarded a rule
that he was bound to follow;
(4) whether the agent’s conduct was authorized;
205. Proprietary capacity, procedural estoppel, affirmative misconduct, actual au
thority, and Lazy FC balancing.
206. For example, the Court refused to estop the government based on its proce
dural capacity in Schweiker, when it could have considered the various other factors but
failed to. Note that the Court also considered whether the SSA’s conduct was an “af
firmative misconduct” in Schweiker, but considering only two of the various factors still
resulted in what surely would be considered an unjust result if the case were litigated
between two private parties. For example, if the Court would have engaged in Lazy FC
balancing and gave weight to this analysis, it may have determined that even though the
SSA’s agent’s conduct “fell far short” of what constituted estoppel under that factor, it
may have concluded that the private litigant would prevail under the Lazy FC test.
Failure to use all factors in the test will not save many litigants from injustice.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE104.txt

194

unknown

Seq: 32

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

6-SEP-11

16:53

[Vol. 33:163

(5) whether the government employee engaged in “affirma
tive” misconduct;
(6) the egregiousness of the injustice that would result if the
government was not held estopped; and
(7) whether failing to estop the government would serve to
substantially undermine the core legislative purpose of the stat
ute in question.
The core legislative purpose factor would require a court to
consider the facts of the case at bar, and then ascertain the “core
legislative purpose” of the statute. If this purpose is substantially
undermined by the failure to impose an estoppel, then the court
should strongly consider estopping the government, subject to the
application of the other factors in the test. The crux of the need for
this test, much like the actual authority test, is partially based upon
the separation of powers principles. The reasons for only allowing
the government to be estopped when its agent acts within its au
thority are well-known and have already been covered exten
sively.207 With these in mind, it makes little sense to fail to estop
the government when an agent’s actions are not consistent with the
delegation of congressional powers (that is, employing this “im
proper legislation”) and their actions thus serve to circumvent or
otherwise undermine the meaning of the statute as well.
Ansell argues that estopping the government for the unautho
rized conduct of its agent would lead to a separation of powers vio
lation because the judiciary would be infringing on Congress’s
legislative powers.208 He states: “If the government is estopped as a
result of unauthorized government action, congressional power to
legislate under Article I is undermined.”209 However, what Ansell
and many other observers fail to fully appreciate is that, in many
cases, failing to estop government agents acting within their powers
likewise violates the separation of powers principle, even if not in
the strictest sense, if the consequences of the agent’s actions sub
stantially undermine the statute in question.210
We are left with an interesting dichotomy. The traditional sep
aration of powers argument, explained by Ansel, Raven-Hansen,
and others, is that an estoppel based on an agent’s misrepresenta
tion made because of an agent’s mistaken belief or otherwise, can
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra Part II.D.
See Ansell, supra note 167, at 1037.
Id. (emphasis added).
See infra Part IV.C (discussion of Nagle and Dempsey).
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not stand because it would be giving effect to an agent’s actions
made pursuant to no authority whatsoever. This results in a cir
cumvention, or a de facto supersession of legislative power. How
ever, under some circumstances, denying estoppel of the
government also undermines Congress’s Article I power to legislate
by frustrating the purpose Congress intended when it enacted the
statute.211 The proponents of the traditional separation of powers
objection to government estoppel is that it allows a result or action
that Congress did not wish to occur, but in some instances, ignoring
the broader purpose also actualizes a result Congress did not in
tend. In fact, refusal to estop may produce an outcome that is anti
thetical to the very reason the agency in question exists.
Further illustration of this factor will be provided later, but
preliminarily the facts in Schweiker provide an adequate demon
stration of the application of the proposed factor. Recall, in
Schweiker, an SSA agent mistakenly advised Hansen that she was
ineligible for social security benefits, and omitted to tell her to fill
out a written application even though the SSA claims manual di
rected agents to advise claimants to take such action. The Supreme
Court denied estoppel, reasoning in part that allowing such estop
pels would deprive Congress of enforcing its mandate that written
applications be submitted. The core legislative purpose factor
would recognize what the Court ignored—that Hansen was sub
211. The judicial system is a mighty chorus bellowing this refrain. See, e.g., Wade
Pediatrics v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 567 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir.
2009); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Courts
generally disfavor the application of the estoppel doctrine against the government and
invoke it only when it does not frustrate the purpose of the statutes expressing the will
of Congress or unduly undermine the enforcement of the public laws.” (citing Trapper
Mining, Inc. v Lujan, 923 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir. 1991))); Che-Li Shen v. INS, 749 F.2d
1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that when a party seeks to estop the government,
estoppel will not be judicially used to “frustrate the purpose of valid statutes expressing
the will of Congress”). Anecdotally, this reasoning is also prevalent in Massachusetts
equitable estoppel case law. See, e.g., Risk Mgmt. Found. of Harvard Med. Inst., Inc. v.
Comm’r of Ins., 554 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Mass. 1990) (“Estoppel is not applied to govern
mental acts where to do so would frustrate a policy intended to protect the public inter
est.” (quoting LaBarge v. Chief Admin. Just. of the Trial Ct., 524 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Mass.
1988))); Langlitz v. Bd. of Registration of Chiropractors, 486 N.E.2d 48, 51-52 (Mass.
1985); Weston Forest and Trail Ass’n, Inc. v. Fishman, 849 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2006) (ruling that estoppel would “frustrate [the governmental] policy”). However,
as this Note has explored, estoppel should be applied to government acts when to do so
would promote a policy intended to protect the public interest. Cf. United States v.
Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 761 (1st Cir. 1985) (“The possibility of harm to a private
party inherent in denying equitable estoppel . . . is often (if not always) grossly out
weighed by the pressing public interest in the enforcement of congressionally mandated
public policy.” (citing Best v. Stetson, 691 F.2d 42, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1982))).
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stantively eligible for benefits. While Congress intended written
applications to be submitted, the overriding purpose behind the
SSA is that the people Congress deemed deserving of social secur
ity benefits would receive them.212 While Congress did require
written applications to facilitate accomplishment of this goal, it
makes little sense to refuse to estop on the basis of preserving Con
gressional intent on the facilitative policy while ignoring the larger
legislative objective—to ensure delivery of benefits to those deserv
ing. One should not lose sight of the forest for the trees.213
A statute is an embodiment of carefully crafted public policy
that was the result of years of congressional hearings, findings, and
research. Rigid adherence to the traditional no-estoppel rule is
sometimes tantamount to the court ruling the traditional reasons
underlying the no-estoppel rule trump the legislative initiative re
flected in a statute, something that, if not explicitly barred by the
constitution, is looked upon with strict disfavor by observers of the
judicial system.214 This is improper, and courts should exercise the
utmost care to avoid this when handling cases concerning equitable
estoppel against the government. Judges here are making their own
law, a power reserved solely for Congress.215
Ansell and others believe that estoppels based on an agent’s
ultra vires acts undermines Congress’s article I legislation powers,
but when courts harm the statute’s underlying purpose, Congress’s
power is similarly undermined because a statute, via its purpose, is
an affirmative congressional proclamation directing government
212. The first words in H.R. 7260, the Bill which became the SSA described its
purpose as:
An act to provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal
old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more adequate
provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children,
maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their un
employment compensation laws; to establish a Social Security Board; to raise
revenue; and for other purposes.
H.R. 7260, 74th Cong. (1935).
213. Note, there are several different factors at play in this situation, this is why
the factors need to be applied in conjunction with each other. In addition to the sepa
ration of powers concerns discussed here, also related are the “procedural estoppel”
issues, and there is a question as to whether this misconduct was affirmative. While
some cases may require some applications of the individual tests (proprietary capacity,
actual authority, Lazy FC balancing, etc.), others may involve applications of other
such tests. All of these concerns must be considered by the court.
214. Even in the absence of a constitutional issue, a full analysis of which is ad
mittedly outside the scope of this Note, courts should strive to maintain the congres
sional prerogative whenever possible. See cases cited supra note 211.
215. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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agents to perform certain functions Congress deems socially and
administratively desirable. Ansel writes: “Estoppel would endorse
the decisions of executive agents that are contrary to congressional
commands and directives. The executive branch would be refash
ioning the law through its errors in individual cases, thus contraven
ing the separation of powers.”216 The logic behind this reasoning is
sound, and indeed it should carry the day in appropriate cases.
However, it sometimes needs to give way when the larger legisla
tive goal is being effectively circumvented. Failing to estop the gov
ernment in these cases leads to ignorance of the congressional
imperative, severely weakening the statute’s reach, force, power,
and effect. Rather than the executive’s mistakes broadening the
reach of the statute, judicial ignorance of a statute’s core legislative
purpose would unduly limit the congressional affirmation that the
particular subject of the legislation is a social good that needs to be
protected, or an evil that needs to be vanquished. Such a constitu
tional weakness mandates that courts consider the underlying legis
lative purpose of the statute when determining whether to estop the
government.
As previously stated, the vast array of factual situations in
which estoppel issues can arise would make the creation of any test
that would promote justice in all cases impossible to forge. This
multi-factor test is superior because courts will no longer singularly
weigh one factor against another, but instead apply each factor to
the situation and balance them as justice requires, resulting in less
total injustice to litigants while remaining sensitive to the govern
ment’s concerns. However, the application of some factors is strong
in all situations, and should be treated as such. The factor that gov
ernment agents must have acted pursuant to their actual authority
is sometimes treated as a requirement, and should be given great
weight by courts for the reasons outlined above. Absent the most
extreme situations where the immense weight of the other equities
pleads for estoppel, courts should require government agents to
have acted pursuant to their actual authority in order to be es
topped. This is because, as previously stated, estopping the govern
ment in these cases would enforce the effect of an ultra vires act,
redefining the proper role of that agent. However, this must be
tempered by the “core legislative purpose” factor, and should, in
appropriate cases, be given great weight as well. Similarly, the af
firmative misconduct requirement should likewise be given great
216.

Ansell, supra note 167, at 1037.
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significance, because doing so would address the concerns underly
ing the traditional no-estoppel rule, namely, limiting liability.
In many cases the basis of the litigant’s estoppel claim resulted
in a slight to the litigant at the government’s hand. Compounding
injustice by a court’s refusal to enforce the Constitution’s separa
tion of powers doctrine, or denying them a substantive right, is an
even worse fate to thrust upon innocent litigants.
B. Determining the Applicable Legislative Purpose
The application of this factor necessitates explanation of how
the “core legislative purpose” should be interpreted in order for the
new factor to operate properly, including providing guidance as to
the proper method of ascertaining the legislative purpose of a stat
ute. Legislative histories are often long and complex, featuring a
voluminous amount of pages from House and Senate Reports, com
ments from the floor, testimony given at and transcripts of commit
tee hearings on the matter, and prior versions of the bill enacted.217
As words are merely indefinite proxies for ideas, no definition
can precisely capture what “core legislative purpose” means in
every instance. The “core legislative purpose” is perhaps best de
fined as “the fundamental and irreducible congressional objective
in enacting the legislation in question.”218 This definition is some
what obscure, as it must be to remain malleable—an essential char
acteristic of this test if it is to lead to optimally just outcomes.
However, some ground rules apply.
Delving deep into the legislative history to determine the pur
pose of the statute is not necessary for this test and should be
avoided.219 Instead, it is only necessary that one know the “core
217. See Jennifer L. Behrens, J. Michael Goodson Law Library, Duke University
School of Law, Research Guides: Federal Legislative History, DUKE LAW (2010), availa
ble at http://www.law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/pdf/fedleghist.pdf.
218. As Justice Holmes put it, “A word is not a crystal, transparent and un
changed, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245
U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916)).
219. Indeed, judges long opposed to the use of legislative history have had no
difficulty determining the “purpose” of a statute. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Cal
vert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396–97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possi
ble the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for
all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what their
rights under those laws are. Here is a controversy which affects every little
merchant in many States. Aside from a few offices in the larger cities, the
materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer who can afford
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legislative purpose,” or as alternatively defined, the “general pur
pose” of the statute.
The terms “general purpose” and “core legislative purpose”
are terms of art that are intentionally and unavoidably ambigu
ous.220 It is impossible for a definition to be created that would
convey to the court interpreting the maxim the same meaning with
precision. What is clear, however, is that “core legislative purpose”
is different from “legislative motive.”
A “legislative motive” test would act as a modifier that would
broaden, rather than restrict the meaning of the test. If “motive”
were used, courts would view the test as examining the statute’s
“purpose” rather than “core legislative purpose.” The result would
neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing, or the cost of repeatedly
examining the whole congressional history. Moreover, if he could, he would
not know any way of anticipating what would impress enough members of the
Court to be controlling. To accept legislative debates to modify statutory pro
visions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.
Id.
Admittedly, today it is much easier for attorneys to access legislative material than
it was when Justice Jackson expressed this view. What has yet to change, however, is
the fact that legislative histories are often a compilation of dueling agendas, providing
little guidance of the intent of a large and diverse body.
220. Alas, legal terms are often inescapably vague, as they must be to apply to the
multitudinous factual situations with which they are confronted. As such, they must be
read applying jus aequum to best effectuate their purpose. For example, see “miscar
riage of justice” (often termed “substantial miscarriage of justice,”) defined as “[a]
grossly unfair outcome in a judicial proceeding, as when a defendant is convicted de
spite a lack of evidence on an essential element of the crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION
ARY, supra note 2, at 1088. While this definition appears straightforward, it is
undoubtedly subject to interpretation, as reasonable minds can differ as to what consti
tutes a “grossly unfair outcome” or whether evidence was truly lacking in an element of
the crime at trial. Examples such as these are endless. As such, modifiers are placed to
serve as a guide to the unwary. In the example above “grossly” is present to dissuade
those who might be tempted to reverse a case on appeal for what they believe is merely
a slight to the defendant, real or perceived. Similarly, “core” legislative purpose, and
“general” purpose serve this role. These modifiers are meant to dissuade counsel who,
by delving deep into legislative history, can argue that a statement made on the Senate
floor proves conclusively that their interpretation is what Congress had intended.
Additionally, they should not argue that such a minute piece of history affects its
core purpose. While a piece of legislative history might be indicative of one of the
many concerns of Congress, its core purpose should be apparent long before it is dis
covered. Also weighing against this technique is that in reality members of Congress
often make statements on the floor of their respective chamber to obfuscate the true
legislative purpose with which they might disagree.
It should be noted, however, that scratching the statute’s legislative history, may be
helpful, in fact necessary to correctly determine a statute’s core legislative purpose,
especially if the statute is not already well-known among legal professionals. What
should be discouraged, if not barred, is the sort of outright excavation into legislative
history materials described above.
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be an unduly broad test that, instead of acting like the net catching
litigants, would become a chasm in which they would fall.
An unduly broad interpretation of “core legislative purpose”
would lead to courts disregarding the test altogether. It is unde
manding for an attorney zealously representing the government to
cobble together a patchwork argument that the government agent
was complying with the statute’s “motive.” The word itself is so
vague it can be contrived so that statutes can appear to have a mo
tive that in fact they never had.
Inquiring into the legislative “motive” would encourage attor
neys to delve into the legislative history of the statute in question,
as it is very difficult to ascertain a “motive,” even in a broad sense,
without taking this step. Moreover, it is simply too easy to find
material to support an invented “motive” if the statute has many
pages of legislative history.221 As stated earlier, even if the attorney
finds the true legislative motive, in many cases it would be difficult
to determine whether or not the government agent’s conduct ran
contrary to this motive or not. As such, a statute’s “core legislative
purpose” at the very least must mean something more than the con
gressional “motive” for enacting the statute.
Without doubt, a statute’s core legislative purpose and true
motive are related, and indeed in some cases may be the same.
Most times, the legislative motive is reflected in the statute’s gen
eral purpose. However, this does not prevent them from being dis
tinct entities. Only the terminology “core legislative purpose” can
set up the cognitive framework necessary to properly apply this
test.
C. Application of the Test
Dempsey v. Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency provides a terrific example of how a court should determine
the core legislative purpose of a statute.222 Dempsey owned a
house in Arkansas that was insured against all “direct loss by flood”
221. Indeed, safeguards may need to be in place to prevent the introduction of
too much extraneous evidence entered to determine Congress’s intent. What may suf
fice is placing a presumption against admission of that extraneous information to prove
legislative purpose and forcing the burden on the party seeking to admit evidence to
prove that such legislative purpose is multi-faceted or not commonly known before such
evidence can be admitted. Another route is asking the court to take judicial notice of
the broad policy objectives that a statute wishes to accomplish.
222. Dempsey v. Dir. Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency, 549 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
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through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.223 During the
time when his policy was active, a storm struck, causing severe
water damage to his home.224 That very day he notified his insur
ance agent who inspected his home and contacted the General Ad
justment Bureau (GAB) to assess damage to Dempsey’s home.225
During the course of the year, Dempsey continued contact
with the bureau, which sent him a Proof of Loss form approxi
mately a year later that determined Demspey suffered $918.17 in
damages.226 The Bureau instructed him to sign it, have it notarized,
and return the form.227
However, Mr. Dempsey believed that he had suffered more
damage than the amount claimed by the Bureau.228 He amended
the form, claiming $7,711.27, and returned it.229 The Bureau re
jected the amount, and paid nothing despite the fact that it admit
ted it owed Mr. Dempsey the $918.17 in compensation.230
The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Dempsey failed to file a valid Proof of Loss form within sixty days
of the incident, a requirement to bring suit.231 The court estopped
the government from making this argument because no Proof of
Loss form was sent to him in a timely manner.232
Notably, in making its decision the court examined the core
legislative purpose of the National Flood Insurance Act.233 The
court stated:
To begin, the Court notes the government interests involved
here. The broad congressional purpose in establishing the na
tional flood insurance program was to alleviate the personal
hardship and economic distress created by flood damage by mak
ing flood insurance coverage available on “reasonable terms and
conditions” to those persons needing such protection which pri
vate insurers alone could not economically make available. This
Court must construe the provisions of the SFIP in light of its pur
223. Id. at 1335.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1336.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1340.
233. The court did not expressly call it the “core legislative purpose,” but its anal
ysis mirrors what would be the “core legislative purpose” analysis. Id.
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pose to make flood insurance coverage available under “reasona
ble conditions” . . . . Given these purposes of the insurance
program in general and the proof of loss requirement in particu
lar, can it be said that failure to file a timely proof of loss will per
se preclude recovery on the policy in a civil action? This Court
thinks not.234

Notice the court considered a variety of factors in reaching its
decision. Not only did it consider the core legislative purpose of the
SFIP, but it also contains language that mirrors Lazy FC analy
sis.235 Furthermore, in an omitted part of the opinion the court dis
cusses the proprietary versus sovereign distinction.236 Moreover,
the holding of the court itself, that the government was estopped
because it did not mail the Proof of Loss forms within the statutory
period in which a disgruntled citizen could bring suit, is reminiscent
of a procedural estoppel.
Additionally, had the court not held the government estopped,
the Bureau’s negligence would have allowed it to escape an obliga
tion that Congress clearly intended the citizenry to enjoy. The
court would have, in essence, made a value judgment declaring that
courts’ traditional hesitancy to apply estoppel against the govern
ment was more important than Congress’s core purpose of the Na
tional Flood Insurance Act, thus frustrating the purpose of that
Act. This is not only undesirable, but it impermissibly legislates
from the bench by creating “de facto laws,” the “law” in this case
being that if the Bureau wishes someone to not receive benefits to
which they are entitled, they simply can refrain from mailing the
Proof of Loss Form.
234.

Id. (citation omitted). The court then continued:

The Court finds that the injury to the plaintiff in this case would be great
if estoppel were denied, while injury to the public treasury and weakening of
the purpose underlying the proof of loss requirement would not only be small,
but, if estoppel were not allowed, the public interest in compensating individu
als for flood damage would suffer: a victim of flood damage would be unjustly
precluded from being compensated contrary to the objective of the legislation.
Id.
235.
236.

Id.
The court stated:

This Court holds [that] . . . the government agency will not be permitted belat
edly to assert a technical defense to a law suit which admittedly, if it had been
in a state court against a private insurance carrier, would not have prevailed.
The Agency was not in any sense acting in a sovereign capacity here but was
engaged in essentially a private business.
Id. at 1340.
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Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Regional School District is a more
recent example where the dissenting judge explored the importance
of the core legislative purpose underlying the Family Medical Leave
Act.237
School monitor Kathleen Nagle was hired at the school district
in 2000.238 In January of 2004, her husband became ill.239 She re
quested time off under the Family Medical Leave Act.240 The act
allows any family member to take unpaid leave for a period of up to
twelve months to care for an ailing family member, as long as they
worked 1,250 hours in the previous twelve months.241 Nagle had
worked only 554.242 She asked the district’s deputy superintendent
(Frost) if she could be allowed to take FMLA leave despite this.243
Though Nagle claimed he allowed her to, Frost says he did not.244
However, since this was a summary judgment appeal, the facts were
considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and her ver
sion controlled.245
Nagle took leave from January to April.246 She wrote Frost
thanking him for his generosity in March.247 Once she returned in
April, she met with Frost who again told her FMLA leave was
available if necessary.248 Her husband became sick again in May
and died in early June.249 Nagle took what she believed to be
FMLA leave during this time period.250 She was then terminated
upon returning to work in June.251
Nagle sued, alleging a violation of FMLA by her employer.252
The school responded that she was not eligible, and that she was
terminated because her position was no longer needed.253 She ar
gued that the school district was estopped from claiming she was
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 576 F.3d 1, 6-10 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1-2.
Id.
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2009).
Nagle, 576 F.3d at 1-2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
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not eligible because of Frost’s statements.254 The district court
granted summary judgment for the school district, and Nagle
appealed.255
The majority affirmed the district court, stating that a case in
which the government is estopped is “hen’s-teeth rare.”256 The
court repeated the traditional reasons for refusing to estop the gov
ernment, including concerns relating to a potentially negative effect
on the public fisc.257 The court also pointed out that Nagle had
nothing in writing from the school district granting her leave.258
However, the court’s decision largely turned on the court’s unwill
ingness to depart from Supreme Court precedent, which it read as
hostile to estoppel claims against the government.259
Judge Lipez’s dissent criticized the majority for admitting that
the use of estoppel against the government is permissible, while
again rejecting its use in this case for only the reason that the gov
ernment is rarely estopped.260 Judge Lipez then pointed out that
the majority’s concerns about applying estoppel against the govern
ment generally are warranted, but there was little chance in this
case the majority’s fears were founded.261 For example, the major
ity feared the specter of endless liability if estoppel is allowed be
cause of the volume of interaction between government agencies
and the citizenry.262 Judge Lipez rejected this argument more gen
erally by stating that endless litigation probably will not occur be
cause the cost of litigation may prevent low-stakes claims from
being filed, as well as the fact that judges can ferret out unmeritori
ous claims at the early stages of litigation.263 Lipez then stated that
there is an even smaller chance of precedent from cases like these
254. Id. at 3.
255. Nagle v. Acton-Boxborough Reg’l Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (D.
Mass. 2008).
256. Nagle, 576 F.3d at 3 (citation omitted).
257. Id. at 5.
258. Id. (“A prime danger in applying estoppel to the government is the prospect
of he said-she said trials as to whether an alleged oral statement was ever made.”).
259. Id. at 5-6.
260. Id. at 6.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 5. “To open the door to estoppel claims would only invite endless
litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens,
imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc.” Id. (quoting Office of Pers. Mgmt.
v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 433 (1990)).
263. Id. at 9 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
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spurring allegations because Nagle has evidence her allegations are
true.264
Most importantly, though, Judge Lipez reasoned that the use
of estoppel in this context furthers the governmental objective that
the FMLA serves to advance.265 In previous cases, like Richmond,
litigants used estoppel to escape obligations. However, in this case
Nagle is using it to advance the precise reason the FMLA was en
acted to ensure that sick family members get care.266 The Supreme
Court sanctions allowing estoppel in “rare” cases, and these cases
should involve litigants seeking to further policies underlying the
enactment in question.267
Judge Lipez’s dissent demonstrates that a government agent’s
conduct that serves to undermine a statute’s purpose should give
rise to an estoppel claim. It is illogical to believe that an act con
trary to a statute’s purpose that is given effect by a court’s refusal to
estop does not damage the statute. Acting contrary to a statute’s
purpose is tantamount to acting contrary to the statute itself, by
disregarding the will of Congress.268 When a court refuses to estop
the government in this instance it impermissibly legislates, and the
264. Id. Nagle’s note thanking Frost for his assistance. Id.
265. Id. at 7. Judge Lipez found the FMLA’s core legislative purpose thusly:
Allowing her to invoke estoppel against the government would not un
dermine the policy of the act whose limitations she seeks to avoid. The Family
Medical Leave Act . . . is designed, inter alia, to protect the continued employ
ment of individuals-like Nagle-who need time away from their jobs to help
family members confronting serious illnesses. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)
(stating that the Act’s purposes include entitling “employees to take reasona
ble leave for . . . the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health
condition”). . . . [A]llowing Nagle to pursue her claim advances the employeeprotective policy sanctioned by Congress when it enacted the FMLA.
Id. at 7-8.
266. Judge Lipez responded to the argument that the FMLA was not enacted to
aid workers who worked less than the statutory number of hours:
I realize that the Congressional cutoff for FMLA eligibility—1,250 hours
worked in the preceding twelve months—is the product of a deliberate com
promise that balances the needs of employees and their employers.” See 29
U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3) (noting that the Act is designed to accomplish its purposes
“in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers”). But
the explicit provision allowing more generous benefits under state and local
law forecloses an argument that allowing estoppel here would contravene the
federal law.
Id. at 8 n.8.
267. Id. at 10 (“The remedy sought does not violate federal law and, indeed, ad
vances an important public policy . . . . These considerations justify Nagle’s invocation
of the estoppel doctrine.”).
268. See United States v. Freeman 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845) (“A thing
within the intention of the makers of the statute is as much within the statute as if it
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resulting decision weakens the statute by announcing it is permissi
ble for the government to act in a manner prohibited by Congress.
Furthermore, like enforcement of the actual authority requirement,
it prevents litigants from suffering injustices at the hands of a gov
ernment disregarding its supreme law.269
While Judge Lipez performed valiantly in focusing on what
might become the “core legislative purpose” requirement, it is a
worthwhile experiment to determine how the court would apply the
remaining factors.
As stated earlier, the most important factors of this test are the
core legislative purpose, actual authority, and affirmative miscon
duct factors of the test.270 Did Frost’s misleading assertions to Na
gle constitute affirmative misconduct? In Kennedy, the Court held
that a false statement made by a government agent to a citizen was
not by itself an example of affirmative misconduct, even if relied on
to their detriment.271 Nevertheless, Frost’s misrepresentation was
likely not an isolated occurrence, and might have been construed as
being an active pattern of ongoing misrepresentations, a construc
tion which would categorize it as affirmative misconduct.
Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true that Frost had authority to
deny Nagle benefits—benefits she would have no reason to believe
were within the letter.”); cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
459, 461 (1892).
It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute . . . . This is not the substitution of the will of the judge
for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are used in a
statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a considera
tion of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enact
ment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to
the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to
include the particular act . . . . The reason of the law in such cases should
prevail over its letter.
Id.; Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The preference
for plain meaning is based on the constitutional separation of powers—Congress makes
the law and the judiciary interprets it . . . we generally assume that the best evidence of
Congress’s intent is what it says in the texts of the statutes.”).
269. For another example of the proper operation of the core legislative purpose
test, see Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 331 F.3d 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding that although Washington follows the traditional no-estoppel rule, an excep
tion should be made when the Washington Open Meetings Act (OPMA) is at issue
because “these provisions of the Washington code demonstrate a strong legislative in
tent that property held for the public use and benefit not be summarily disposed of
without giving the public affected a significant opportunity to participate” (internal
quotations omitted)).
270. See supra Part IV.A.
271. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961).
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she was entitled if not for the statements by Frost. These factors
considered together tip the scale heavily in Nagle’s favor even with
out considering the remaining factors. However, they are weighed
down even further by the fact that failing to estop the government
in this particular situation results in a level of unfairness that of
fends our notions of justice. The proprietary factor is not applica
ble and thus cannot be considered.
The multi-factor test’s efficacy can be further demonstrated if
applied to the facts in Merrill.272 In Merrill, the Court simply deter
mined that the government could not be held estopped in the same
way as private litigants, and pointed out that the farmers were re
sponsible for knowing the applicable regulations published in the
Federal Register, despite affirmative misrepresentations by the
FCIC’s agent to the contrary.273
If the multi-factor test was applied in this case, a fairer out
come would have followed. Taking each in turn, the traditional ele
ments of estoppel indeed were present. It is undisputed that the
FCIC agent provided the farmers with faulty information, the farm
ers acted in reliance on that information, and they did not recover,
which was to their detriment.274
Next, the government was acting in its proprietary capacity in
this case. The court gave little weight to this, but subsequent juris
prudence has made clear that this should be considered for the
aforementioned reasons.275 Concerning procedural estoppel, while
it is questionable whether the FCIC agent broke its own rules,276 it
is certainly arguable. The agent failed to inform the farmers of the
contents of a newly promulgated regulation. The agent unwittingly
lied to the farmers, which can be viewed as affirmative misconduct,
since it may have been reasonable for the agent to be aware of an
important published regulation so vital to the advice he gave. How
ever, even if the conduct was not “affirmative,” the other factors
militation toward estoppel could overcome this. Concerning actual
authority, it is true that the agent did not have authority to change
this regulation, so traditional separation of powers argument would
state that permitting an estoppel in this instance would allow the
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
See supra

See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.
As stated previously, Schweiker is a better example of procedural estoppel.
notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
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agent to unilaterally change the anti-reseeding crop insurance
regulation.
Perhaps this fact would be enough for some judges to refrain
from going forward with estoppels. However, this situation un
doubtedly begot farmers suffering from long-lasting financial ruin.
Indeed, the Court expressed sympathy for the farmers, stating that
“[t]he case no doubt presents phases of hardship.”277 This was a
hefty price to pay by the farmers for relying on advice from an
agent employed to help them.
Perhaps most importantly, the Court had no difficulty deter
mining the core legislative purpose in the applicable statute, which
was to prevent the exact sort of catastrophe that took place here.278
This makes it a close case. This both demonstrates the need, and
shows it would be prudent for courts to adopt this multi-factor ap
proach, as courts should make every endeavor to prevent grave
injustice.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has stated that applying equitable estoppel
against the government is disfavored, but beyond that it has pro
vided little guidance for lower courts. As such, lower courts and
commentators have fashioned a number of tests to determine in
which situations equitable estoppel should be applied to the gov
ernment. All of them apply to their own particular factual situa
tions, but there remains a natural reluctance to consider all possible
tests when confronted with a situation.
These tests should be viewed as factors within one test. How
ever, of these traditional tests, an important one is missing: whether
the government agent’s actions served to undermine the applicable
statute. Each factor the private litigant can show should weigh
more heavily toward estopping the government. It is undeniable
that the application of the multi-factor test will capture justice when
it slips through the fingers of the status quo, as demonstrated by
applying it to Nagle.
Justice Holmes declared “men must turn square corners when
dealing with the government.” However, the more crucial and
provident maxim is that the judiciary must turn square corners
when interpreting the Constitution. Failing to estop the govern
ment when its agent’s conduct allows it to perform acts directly con
277.
278.

Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947).
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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trary to the statute that they are charged with facilitating is an
affront to the spirit of both ordinary statutes and the Constitution
itself. Only through ensuring that government agents’ acts are done
in accordance with the core legislative purpose will it be certain that
and a just result secured.
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